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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Great Proceduralist 
JEFFREY S. SUTTON 
Brooklyn is a place for breaking barriers, as one son and one daughter of 
the Borough confirm. Jackie Robinson and Ruth Bader Ginsburg did it the same 
way, out-performing the existing stars and mastering the finer points of the 
game. 
Throughout history, sad to say, newcomers rarely enter closed fields merely 
because they are as good as the current players. The secret to entry, the secret to 
change, is establishing superiority, especially when it comes to the most 
difficult-to-execute parts of the game. Opening hearts requires opening minds. 
And opening minds often requires seeing how the new entrant will change the 
game. 
For all of the talents and personal qualities that Jackie Robinson brought to 
the challenges of ending the color barrier in baseball and other sports, he was 
especially good at the inside-baseball parts of the game. Sure, he batted over 
.300 for six straight seasons, stole lots of bases, could hit for power, and helped 
the Dodgers win many games.1 But what fellow players and astute fans likely 
appreciated most were the less prominent, less measurable, parts of his game: 
his ability to take the extra base, his penchant for stealing home, his ability to 
avoid double plays on offense and turn them on defense, his fielding prowess, 
his ability to advance a runner. He not only could play like the rest; he was better 
than the rest, or at least most of them, especially if you pulled all of these 
statistical and non-statistical measures together. All of this through a Major 
League Baseball career that did not start until age 28.2 
If 42’s wide-ranging skills brought shame to the color line, 107’s skill set 
did the same for the gender line. No one has yet found a way to apply 
sabermetrics to the legal profession. But they will. And when they do, when 
they come up with a Wins Above Replacement scorecard for practicing lawyers 
and an On Base Plus Slugging Percentage rating for justices, I have a prediction: 
lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Justice Ginsburg will do well. 
Why? Ask Jackie Robinson. She excelled at the parts of law that distinguish 
lawyers and judges the most. Sure, she won landmark constitutional cases as an 
advocate and wrote them as a justice. But ask a first-year law student or grizzled 
lawyer what’s the most challenging general subject, and you will get the same 
answer: procedure. Procedural law is lawyer’s law. No sane individual would 
learn it if they didn’t have to. But every litigator has to. Few enjoy it at the start. 
It’s technical. It’s dry as dust. It’s complicated. And it often turns cases. 
In the absence of sabermetrics evidence to prove me wrong, I wonder: was 
Justice Ginsburg the greatest proceduralist to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court? 
Ample evidence suggests so. During her 27 years on the Court, no one to my 
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knowledge took on more of the procedural cases than she did. Her serial 
assignments confirm what Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts, and 
everyone else knew: she was the go-to justice when it came to untangling vexing 
procedural disputes. It didn’t hurt that, before joining the Court, Justice 
Ginsburg had taught civil procedure for nearly two decades and had handled 
many cases on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union.3 With 
characteristic precision and clarity, she brought order (and unanimity) to some 
of the Court’s most perplexing procedural cases over nearly three decades. 
No example stands taller than Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.4 Justice Ginsburg 
penned a unanimous, to-the-point opinion that brought coherence to an area 
sorely in need of it: clarifying when a statutory requirement restricts a federal 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.5 She noted that “jurisdiction” had come to be 
a word of “many, too many, meanings,” and that courts had been “profligate” 
in imprecisely using the term.6 She showed how courts, too often, had been 
confusing mandatory claim-processing rules for jurisdictional limitations.7 
Failure to appreciate the distinction had real-world consequences. Because a 
party may not forfeit or waive a jurisdictional limitation, any lax labeling of 
these requirements permitted sharp-elbowed litigants (or slow-to-learn litigants) 
to raise the limitation for the first time on appeal. That is always inefficient and 
sometimes unfair. Mindful of these and other consequences, Justice Ginsburg 
imposed order on chaos, laying out a “readily administrable bright line” rule: a 
procedural requirement creates a jurisdictional limitation only if Congress 
clearly says so.8 
In the last 14 years, over 7,000 cases have invoked Arbaugh.9 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has issued an opinion applying it to a new procedural 
requirement in almost every one of those years.10 Justice Ginsburg, no surprise, 
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wrote a good many of them. Time after time, she convinced all nine members 
of the Court to speak as one through her voice, one nearly inaudible at a dinner 
table but one that spoke volumes in an opinion.11 
She did the same thing in another area that had bewildered litigants and 
lower court judges. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. tackled 
the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine,12 which purports to explain when a state court 
judgment divests a federal district court of jurisdiction to hear claims relating to 
that judgment.13 Here again, a tricky point of process had been “[v]ariously 
interpreted in the lower courts,” and “construed to extend far beyond [its] 
contours” in ways that betrayed a misapprehension of subject matter jurisdiction 
limits.14 What had divided the lower courts united the Supreme Court with 
Justice Ginsburg at the helm. She wrote a unanimous opinion, mopping up the 
mess and distilling the inquiry into a one-sentence test: the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine strips federal district courts of jurisdiction only to hear “cases brought 
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
court review and rejection of those judgments.”15 
Exxon Mobil’s statistics outrun Arbaugh’s. It’s racked up more than 8,000 
case citations.16 And the Court has barely touched it since,17 suggesting Justice 
Ginsburg did some good in an area that had spawned seven certiorari petitions 
in one year.18 While the lower courts have not all followed her lead and while 
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some work remains to be done in the area,19 here’s to hoping that at some point 
we can all come to appreciate what she did: if your name is not Rooker or 
Feldman, the odds are high the doctrine is not for you. 
If any of this makes you wonder whether Justice Ginsburg valued form over 
substance, think again. Her process-driven decisions served the end of 
refocusing lawyers and judges on clear rules that served the ends of justice and 
eliminating those that did not. 
One last opinion from her repertoire illustrates the point. Becker v. 
Montgomery isn’t a case most students come across in law school.20 It’s too 
ordinary, too run of the mine. But it’s also readable and relatable. Dale Becker 
filed a civil rights lawsuit on his own, worried about exposure to second-hand 
cigarette smoke in prison.21 He lost.22 Undeterred, he filed an appeal.23 Perhaps 
out of a sense of the gravity of the pleading, he typed his signature on the notice 
of appeal rather than signing it by hand.24 Without giving Becker a chance to 
fix the defect, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a signature 
and lack of jurisdiction.25 
In yet another unanimous opinion, Justice Ginsburg rejected this penny 
pinching. She explained that Civil Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement 
contemplated that its omission could be fixed when flagged for the party.26 She 
reminded the reader that procedural rules can (and often explicitly do) value 
substance over form.27 And she emphasized that “imperfections . . . should not 
be fatal” when there is no “genuine doubt” about what’s going on.28 
The end of procedure is substance, of course. And that substantive end is 
best advanced by clear procedural rules, ideally made through unanimous or 
near-unanimous decisions. Lack of clarity in law not only haunts lawyers; it 
hurts litigants too. It drives up costs, and it increases barriers to justice. Lower-
court judges, the “inferior” judges of the federal system, appreciate clarity as 
well. Many of our cases would not exist but for imprecise decisions of the Court; 
and much of this litigation could be resolved far more promptly without the 
sharp fencing that unruly procedure permits. Thanks to Justice Ginsburg, the 
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Court during her twenty-seven-year tenure cleaned up many areas of procedure 
that stood in the way of the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of every 
case, in the words of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29 Think 
about that accomplishment. In how many other areas of federal law do we find 
clear rules of law announced through super-majority decisions? 
Because procedure and substance go together, superiority in the one often 
leads to superiority in the other. That is Justice Ginsburg. Call her the Notorious 
RBG if you like. But for me, she is Justice Ginsburg, the Great Proceduralist, 
who broke barriers in law by mastering the most vexing features of the legal 
system. 
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